

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL ESTIMATES BOARD

13 July 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, OIR
General John Weckerling, G-2
Captain Ray Malpass, ONI
Colonel Edward H. Porter, AFOM
Captain R. G. McCool, JIG

SUBJECT : NEE-40: Potential Military, Economic and
Scientific Accretions to the USSR Resulting
from the Acquisition of Western Europe
before Mid-1952

1. The enclosed terms of reference, indicating the
allocations of production responsibility, were agreed on by
the IAC representatives meeting on 12 July.

2. It is requested that contributions be received in
this office by the close of business on Wednesday, 17 October.

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Executive Secretary

Distribution "B"

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

12 July 1951

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-1,0: POTENTIAL MILITARY,
ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC ACCRETIONS TO THE USSR
RESULTING FROM THE ACQUISITION OF WESTERN EUROPE
BEFORE MID-1952

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the potential military, economic, and scientific accretions to the USSR resulting from the acquisition of Western Europe* before mid-1952.

SCOPE

The study would first (Section I) evaluate the military, economic, and scientific potential of Western Europe in terms of its usefulness to the USSR. The study would then (Section II) examine, under the assumption of wartime conditions, the

* Continental Europe west of the Iron Curtain, including Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria, West Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Yugoslavia, France, Spain, Portugal, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, but excluding the UK and all colonial possessions of the Western European countries.

SECRET

factors, excluding destruction by military action, which would retard or prevent full Soviet utilization of the area's war potential. No attempt will be made to reach conclusions regarding a Soviet intent to overrun Western Europe, but certain limited conclusions may emerge which might shed light on the role of Western Europe in the Kremlin's over-all strategic planning.

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

- I. WHAT MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND SCIENTIFIC ADVANTAGES WOULD ACCRUE TO THE USSR FROM ACQUISITION OF THE TERRITORY AND TOTAL RESOURCES OF WESTERN EUROPE?

(This section is intended to examine the Western European situation "as is," disregarding such factors as US counter-action, destruction by Western forces, or interdiction of the conquered areas' normal trade with non-Soviet areas.)

G-2
(coordinating
Defense)

A. MILITARY

1. Defensive advantages, or reduction of potential military threat to the USSR (denial to the US

of manpower, air bases, land approaches to the USSR, etc.).

2. Offensive advantages, or increased facilities for military action against the US, the UK, and other non-Soviet countries resulting from acquisition of bases, trained manpower, munitions, etc.

OIR
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B. ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC

1. What would be the gross accretion to the Soviet military potential from Western European stocks, resources, and productive capacity?
2. In what particular lines would the economic and scientific potential of Western Europe make the greatest contribution to Soviet strength?

II. UNDER THE ASSUMPTION OF WARTIME CONDITIONS, WHAT FACTORS, EXCLUDING DESTRUCTION BY MILITARY ACTION, WOULD TEND TO RETARD OR PREVENT SOVIET UTILIZATION OF WESTERN EUROPE'S POTENTIAL?

(A precise estimate of the damage which could be inflicted by the various military and economic courses of action available to the US is not expected. It is assumed that

the Soviet Union has control of the oil of the Middle East and overland access to all of continental Asia.)

G-2
(coordinating
Defense)

A. MILITARY AND POLITICAL FACTORS

1. Effects of the required deployment of Soviet military forces in Western Europe.
2. Necessity for providing large occupation forces.
3. Administrative problems.
4. Difficulties of organizing and controlling non-Soviet armed forces.

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B. ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC FACTORS

1. What basic problems would confront the USSR in integrating the economies and scientific potential of the newly occupied area with that of the present Soviet orbit and in exploiting Western European resources?
 - (a) Problems of economic administration and management, including conversion and standardization problems, etc.

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- (b) Transportation problems.
 - (c) Specific fields in which the USSR might be forced to rely on Western European scientific and technical personnel.
 - (d) Problem of non-cooperation and obstruction by Western European labor forces.
2. To what degree is the Western European economy dependent on imports from non-Soviet areas?
To what extent could these imports be supplied by the USSR?
3. To what extent could Western European resources and productive capacity supplement those of the USSR?